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The Worsening EU-Turkey Relations
Birol A. Yesilada
Turkey's Role in the Twenty-First Century

In recent years, two developments have challenged Turkey's national and cultural identity--a growing
Islamist movement at home and the European Union's (EU) orientation toward Turkey. While the
Turkish government and the military continue to pursue a pro-NATO foreign policy orientation, an
increasing number of Turks have begun to question whether the country could not be better served
by reducing their ties to the EU. The apparent dissatisfaction with the West stems, to a
significantextent, from the EU's decision to exclude Turkey from the next wave of EU membership
expansion. At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997, the European leaders added insult to injury
by including Cyprus (the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government) among the first wave
of the next members. 1
Today, EU-Turkey relations stand at an all time low with little prospect for improvement. The
European Parliament recently invited Turkey to enter into political dialogue with the union. However, it
listed the same conditions for membership that were outlined in the EU's earlier rejection of Turkey's
candidacy. 2 The Turkish reaction has been a flat refusal of dialogue with the EU as long as the union
maintains its position on Turkey's membership.
These developments raise questions over how Turkey might revise its foreign, economic, and security
policies to better position itself in the next century. During the 1990s, Turkish leaders initiated bold
economic, political, and security relations with the Turkic republics of [End Page 144] Central Asia
and Azerbaijan, brought together the Black Sea states in an economic framework known as the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, and signed agreements with Israel. Can these efforts replace the key
position the EU currently holds in Turkish external trade and security relations? To what other
alternatives can the Turks look?
Clearly absent from these agreements is any serious attempt to improve Turkey's ties to the Islamic
states of the Middle East. Even the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party, when it was the majority coalition
partner in the Erbakan-Çiller coalition, failed to achieve tangible results in Turkey's economic relations
with the Islamic world. In general, the Islamists would like to cut Turkey's ties to the West and
improve relations with the Islamic world. This is most apparent in the position taken by the Refah and
Fazilet (Virtue) Parties in recent years. Would continued problems with the EU help the Islamists in
their objectives? 3 As these questions imply, Turkish leaders face important challenges as they
prepare their country for the next millennium. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current
state of EU-Turkey relations and assess the implications of the recent problems for Turkey's foreign
and domesticpolicy orientation in the twenty-first century.

A Brief History of EU-Turkey Relations
Turkey's relations with the EU date back to the late 1950s, when the Menderes government applied
for an associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Following lengthy
negotiations, the EEC granted this membership to Turkey under the Ankara Agreement of 1963 soon
after it entered intoa similar agreement with Greece. 4 Since then, relations between the EU/EEC and
Turkey have been mixed. At times, political and economic ties improved beyond anyone's
expectations. Following the military interventions in Turkey in 1971 and 1980, however,the Europeans
suspended economic assistance to the military governments. With thetransition to civilian rule,

relations between the two parties improved rapidly. In 1987, the Özal government applied for
membership in the EU, then called the European Community (EC), because it felt confident that the
country's economic transformation and integration with global capitalism would ease its accession to
the EC. Despite the Turkish government's enthusiasm, European leaders quickly dismissed the issue
and announced that Turkey was not ready for full membership. 5 While many authors' assessments of
the reasons for Turkey's ineligibility for membership vary, they all agree that full membership is not
probable in the near future. 6 Conditions for membership for [End Page 145] prospective applicants
have been outlined by the EU, in chronological order with increasing specificity, in the Treaty of Rome,
the Birkelbach Report of 1962, the Maastricht Treaty, Agenda 2000, the Amsterdam Treaty, and most
recently inthe proceedings of the Luxembourg summit. There are four specific conditions that a
prospective candidate must meet in order to qualify for membership in the union:
Political. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and
protection of minorities.
Economic. Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well as
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Europeanness. Membership requires that candidates must belong to the European family
of nation-states.
Other. Membership requires the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including
adherence to the [EU's] aims of political, economic, and monetary union. 7
Turkey failed to convince the Europeans that it was ready for membership on economic and political
grounds. Turkey's economy couldpresent a huge burden to the regional and structural funds, and the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); it has exhibited all the signs of a structurally weak economy with
high inflation, low per capita income, and a large deficit. An additional problem was thehigh degree of
similarity between Turkish exports to the EC and those of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 8 These
members had strongincentives to oppose Turkish products from gainingfree entry into the EC markets.
In terms of politics, Europeans still viewed the Turkish political system as being a weak democracy
that did not guarantee its citizens full civil and political rights. At the time, the Turkish political system
resembled a combination of limited pluralism and state authoritarianism of the corporatist nature. 9 As
far as the Europeans were concerned, the Turkish political system fell short of a Western-style
representative liberal democracy because of restrictions on civil and political rights.
On the positive side, Turkey's emerging market, its dynamic private sector, growing consumer market,
and direct economic links to the other Turkic states of the former Soviet Union made it difficult for the
European leaders to simply reject the Turkish application without searching for an alternative
outcome. Furthermore, Turkey's increasingstrategic importance for NATO's regional interests
suggested that Washington would not be pleased with excluding this country from the EC.
As a result of these important considerations, European and Turkish leaders began a series of talks
that eventually resulted in a [End Page 146] compromise solution which neither shut the door for
future membership in the EU nor granted the Turks immediate accession. The outcome was the
Customs Union (CU) agreement of 1995, which commencedon December 31, 1995. This agreement
gave the Turks closer economic ties with the EU than any other nonmember country at the time, with
the exception of Iceland and Norway. While the details of the CU will be discussed later, it is
important to notethat this agreement opened the Turkish market of 65 million consumers to EU
companies. In addition, easier access to other Turkic republics through Turkey further increased the
investment opportunities of the Europeans. The CU also provided an opportunity for third party
companies, such as those fromAmerica and Japan, to take advantage of the lower cost Turkish labor
market to manufacture products for sale in the EU. For the Turks, the CU symbolized their
membership in Europeand acceptance by the EU, thus putting Turkey on track for full membership.
For the Europeans, however, the CU was the most Turkey could ever expect from the union.

Membership was still not an option.
A crucial factor that convinced the EU to ratify the CU was the growing Islamist movement in Turkey.
Officials throughout Western capitals and in Turkey feared that rejection of the CU would strengthen
the hand of the Islamic political forces against secular oriented political parties during the national
elections of December 1995. In fact, the U.S. administration exerted pressure on EU members to
ratify the treaty. Despite the ratification of the CU, the Islamist Refah Party received 21 percent of the
votes in the 1995 electionsand asserted itself as a major player in Turkish politics.

The Current Situation
At the Luxembourg summit of the European Council, EU officials announced their plans for future
expansion of the union 10 in line with the recommendations of the European Commission that were
outlined earlier in Agenda 2000. The announcement emphasized the EU's economic and political
interests in inviting Eastern and Central European countries to join the union and called for the
implementation of a comprehensive program to prepare these countries for membership. The
bewildering part of this plan for the Turks was the decision to exclude Turkey from the list when such
weak democracies as Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were included. In addition, almost all of the
potentialmembers have weaker economies than Turkey. The final insult for the Turks was the decision
to include the Greek side of Cyprus with complete disregard forinternational treaties concerning the
[End Page 147] establishment of the Cyprus Republic. As for Turkey, the EU ignored pressure from
the United States to include it among the second group of candidates and announced the following
European strategy for Turkey:
Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant states. While
the political and economic conditions allowing accession to be envisaged are not satisfied,
the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn
up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every
field. This strategy should consist of: Development of the possibilities afforded by the
Ankara Agreement; Intensification of the Customs Union; Implementation of financial
cooperation; Approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis [sic]; Participation, to
be decided case by case, in certain programmes and in certain agencies provided for in
paragraphs 19 and 21 [referring to such programs as education, training and research,
and participation in the Community agencies]. 11
The EU further stressed that strengthening Turkey's ties with the union depended on five conditions
beginning with Turkey'spursuit of political and economic reforms. Second, Turkey must improve its
human rights record and its treatment of the Kurdish minority. Third, Ankara needs to improve
relations with Greece and settle Aegean disputes through legal processes, including the International
Court of Justice. Fourth, Turkey must support the UN mediation efforts in Cyprus and not object to
Cyprus's membership in the EU. Lastly, the Turkish government should persuade the Turkish Cypriot
community to join the Greek Cypriots at the accession talks with the EU. Anticipating Turkey's reaction
to the Luxembourg announcement, the EU attempted to soften the blow by inviting Turkey to the
European Conference in March 1998 alongside the eleven candidate countries. The purpose of the
conference was to launch the process of EU accession for the ten Eastern European countries and
Cyprus.
The Turkish Reaction
The initial Turkish reaction to the Luxembourg declaration was harsh and swift. Turkish political,
business, and military leaders called the EU decision a betrayal. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz argued in
an interview with CNN that Turkey was the only country that had signed a CU agreement with the EU
and at the same time had beenkept outside the union's membership plans. 12 He also pointed to the
fact that since the CU entered into effect, Turkey's trade deficit with the EU surpassed $22 billion,
suggesting that the Turks were now partly financing the EU's expansion plans. Yilmaz further argued

that the EU [End Page 148] had no real reason to fear Turkey's membership because the Turkish
economy was sound and its political system free of any fundamentalist threat. As a direct message to
EU leaders, Turkish Airlines immediately choseBoeing for its next purchase of forty-nine aircraft worth
$2.5 billion.
On the foreign policy front, the Turkish government announced that it wouldgo ahead with plans to
integrate northern Cyprus if the EU launched accession talks with the island's Greek Cypriot
government. 13 This process would be gradual and would parallel EU-Cyprus integration. Furthermore,
the Turks declared that they no longer considered the EU a neutral third party in the Cyprus problem
and thus the EU would be viewed as a non-player in the mediation efforts. The Turkish Cypriots
welcomed the Turkish officials' announcements. The President of the "Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus" (TRNC), Rauf Denktas, hardened his negotiating position by announcing that "if they want our
participation [in accession talks], then they should recognize our state, there is no other way." 14
During the time between the Luxembourg summit and the European Conference in London, the world
witnessed intense diplomatic traffic aimed at defusing tensions between the EU and Turkey. American
diplomats attempted to persuade the Turks to attend the meeting in London and, at the same time,
pressed their European partners to provide Turkey with an explicit statement about when it can
expect to join the group of new members. The Americans emphasized that Turkey belongs in the EU
and that the Turks would bemore likely to make the right choices about their own future if the EU
made clear that it was holding a place for them. The problem with this view is that it is not clear
when "Turkey will be ready for membership" and more importantly, who is making that decision.
In earlier studies, 15 this author has argued that the Turkish economic burden on the EU's budget
represents the greatest obstacle for its membership in the union. Once a member, Turkey would
qualify for assistance from the structural funds and could bankrupt theCAP. On the political front,
while Turkey's democracy still fails to meet Western standards in terms of individual civil and political
rights, it is clearly more developed than most of the current candidate countries' political systems. The
current political system, based on the 1982 constitution, still places restrictions on these rights. While
gradual liberalization is underway, the present system is not as open as the previous constitutional
order of 1961-80. However, there have been signsof areturn to a more open and pluralist political
order during the last decade. This is a slow process that needs the recognition and support of
Turkey's Western allies. [End Page 149]
Finally, on legal grounds, Turkey is a member state in all other European intergovernmental
organizations. This qualifies Turkey for membership as a European state. Culturally, however, most
Europeans do not view the Turks as belonging to Europe due to Turkey's Islamic and Middle Eastern
character.

Implications of these Problems for Turkey
Growing strains in EU-Turkey relations have resulted in renewed debate among Turks about
theircultural identity and the country's future orientation. For many, rejection of membership by the
EU had more to do with the country's Islamic culture and Greece's opposition to Turkey than with the
development of the Turkish economic and political systems. This view is reinforced when Turks
compare their country's economy and democratic government to those of their East European
neighbors. As Sabri Sayari explains, "many secularist Turks also believe that Turkey's rejection by the
EU will only strengthen the political appeal of the Islamists, who have argued for many years that
Turkey should limit its relations with the West and instead seek closer ties with the Islamic states in
the world." 16 This outcome is indeed possible given the current struggle between the Islamists and
the Turkish military. Furthermore, the Turks' apparent conviction that the EU now supports Greece's
position in the Greek-Turkish dispute further adds to pressures to move away from European
orientation in foreign policymaking.
The Islamist Threat

Is there an Islamist threat to the secular Turkish republic? While policymakers and scholars disagree
on the danger of political Islam represented by the Refah/Fazilet Parties in Turkey, recent
developments demonstrate how serious the Turkish military considers Islamic fundamentalism in the
country. The generals' pressure on the Refah-DYP (Welfare-True Path Party) coalition brought down
the government in 1996. Their "civilian coup" was followed by the decision of the Constitutional Court
to close down Refah and ban its key leaders, including former Prime Minister Erbakan, from political
life on grounds of anti-secular activities aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. Since then,
Refah members of the National Assembly formed a successor political party, the Fazilet (Virtue) Party.
At the time of writing, the state prosecutor stated that Fazilet would face the same fate as Refah ifit
fails to transform into a system-oriented political organization.
Despite the secular elite's forceful exclusion of Islamist politicians from politics, the Islamic
fundamentalist movement in the country [End Page 150] continues to grow. As this author
hasexplained in other studies, 17 the reasons behind this phenomenon are complex and deeply rooted
in Turkey's republican history. In recent decades, these anti-Atatürkist forces (Refah/Fazilet members)
established powerful partnerships with Islamist groups outside the country and created an influential
capital base in Turkey. 18 The institutional framework of the Refah Party highlights how successful the
Islamists have been in capitalizing on thegrowing economic gap between the rich and poor classes in
the country;Refah was the only political party that practiced true grassroots politics. Through its
neighborhood representatives, the Refah Party provided economic, financial, and educational
assistance to the lower social classes and questioned the secular elite's pro-Western policies. Its 3.5
million strong membership is a tribute to this success. Despite Refah's closure, its infrastructure
remains intact and ready to continue the mission of the Islamists under the Fazilet Party. Turkey's
problems with the EU, as well as occasional difficulties with the United States, provide additional
ammunition for the Islamists in their recruitment of new followers.
Implications for Greek-Turkish Problems
On the security front, Turkish leaders are convinced that the EU is increasingly adopting an attitude
that ignores and complicates Turkey's legitimate security concerns. They point outthat the EU tells
Turkey that solving its problems with Greece is a precondition for membership even though this in
itself does not guarantee accession. Turkey is also asked to agree to unfavorable conditions in the
Aegean and Cyprus in order to avoid aGreek veto of EU enlargement. Furthermore, Cyprus has
beeninvited to join the EU in total disregard of the 1960 agreements, which containsome restrictions
on its membership in international organizations. The Luxembourg decision appears to have been
avictory for Greece. It succeeded in transforming the Greek position on Greek-Turkish problems into
an EU position. The opposition of the German government to Turkish membership, though based on
economic reasons, further enhanced Greece's interests.
After two decades of determined political lobbying, Greece won a clear victory against Turkey within
the union on two important fronts. First, the Greek position on the Islet of Imia or Kardak in the
Aegean became the official EUposition. Thus, the EU no longer posits itself as a neutral party in the
Aegean disputes. Second, Greece succeeded in obtainingthe backing of the EU on the Cyprus problem
despite active pressure against this move from the United States. Americans feared that a "train
wreck" at the Luxembourg summit, anapparent referenceto the clash of EU and Turkish interests,
could potentially destroy [End Page 151] special envoy Richard Holbrooke's mediation efforts in
Cyprus. By threatening to block the entire enlargement process if Cyprus is excluded from the list,
Greek officials forced the Greek position to the forefront of the EU's enlargement agenda.
Unfortunately, the Cyprus issue will remain a major obstacle to improving EU-Turkey relations and is
likely to present additional problems for Turkey in the Council of Europe. There is no doubt that
Turkey will remain a member of the Council of Europe regardless of its membership statusin the EU.
That is, the Turkish government is unlikely to opt out of the European Council just because it is not a
member of the EU. However, Turkey will now face problems in the council due to Cyprus's pending
accession to the EU. As long as the EU was a neutral third party in the Cyprus problem, Turkey was
safeguarded against the Greek Cypriot attempt to expel it from the council. With the recent decision

to bring Cyprus into the EU, this picture may changeas the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments
attempt to secure a common EU foreign policy position toward Turkey. The Turks may feel good
about their policies to integrate northern Cyprus into Turkey (if they are pushed hard enough, some
future Turkish government may go as far as annexing the TRNC under a quasi-federal treaty with
Turkey) butthe danger in such a movelies in the reality that the EU will surely object to a TurkeyTRNC integration and would support the Greek Cypriots' position in the international arena. Already,
the European Court of Justice is on record for passing decisions against the TRNC and Turkey
regarding reparations for property left behind by the Greek Cypriots following the 1974 war.
Can the Turks advance their views on the future of Cyprus without further damaging their relations
with the EU? It seems that the only option, although not without complications, is the legal one. The
EU-Cyprus accession talks can be challenged for violating treaties that established the Cyprus
Republic. 19 The Turks have alreadyraised this issue tothreaten to block Cyprus's membership in the
EU. They point out that whereas there was a mutual decision of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to
apply for membership in the EEC in 1962, the subsequent civil war indefinitely postponed this idea.
The current decision to apply for EU membership is a direct violation of the clause of the Cyprus
Constitution, 20 regardless of whether or not a vice-president is present. Not only did the Greek
Cypriots not consult the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey is not a member of the EU, and therefore, has the
right to object to Cyprus's membership. Fearing long and costly litigation on this issue, the EU
announced at the opening of the Cyprus accession talks that it will proceed with Cypriot membership
whether or not Turkey objects. [End Page 152] The EU's hope is that if theTurks realize the union's
determination on this matter, they will drop their argument.

A Positive Development in the EU-Turkey Relations: The Significance of the
CU
Despite the above mentioned problems and Prime Minister Yilmaz's complaint about thegrowing trade
deficit with the EU, the CU agreement, from whichboth parties seem to have realizedsignificant
economic benefits, is one positive development in EU-Turkey relations. Both parties can gain from the
CU and eventually it will help the latter in its bid for membership in the EU. Turkey has been moving
steadily ahead with structural reforms to integrate its economy with theglobal market. With the
deepening of theCU, this trend is expected to gain additional momentum. Turkey has alsobeen
harmonizing its economic legislation with that of the union. As a result, EU companies operating in
Turkey will face familiar economic and legal conditions and receive the same treatment as national
companies. The elimination of customs duties will, on the one hand, raise Turkish exports to the EU
and on the other hand, enable Turkish companies to reach economies of scale due to competition
from EU firms. This should improve the international competitiveness of Turkish companies as they
adjust to real competition from global firms.
The aggregate impact of the CU on EU-Turkey trade is presented in Table 1. Turkish imports from EU
countries accounted for more thanhalf of its total imports in 1997, with exports to the union
representing46.6 percent of all exports. While these figures are not substantially different from pre1996 figures, they are expected to increase by a few percentage points as the two sides complete the
provisions of the CU.
Among EU countries, Germany remains the biggest single trade partner, accounting for an average of
20 to 25 percent of annual Turkish exports and 15 to 18 percent of annual imports. In addition to
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI)hasalso increasedas a result ofthe CU. This is best indicated by
the sudden jump in investments by French companies in Turkey since 1995. According to figures
provided by the State Planning Organization in Turkey, FDI by French firms increased as follows:
$0.255 billion in 1994, $0.476 billion in 1995, and $2.371 billion in 1997. A noticeable increase can
also be observedfor Dutch companies: $0.194 billion in 1994 and $0.559 billion in 1995. German firms'
investments remained stable at around $0.280 billionper year. When one considers the dynamic
investment environment of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, the attraction of the [End Page 153]
Turkish markets for European investors, including institutional investors in the funds market, becomes
more clear.

The political benefits of the CU are also significant. This treaty has the promise of firmly anchoring
Turkey to the West and to the EU in particular. It will strengthen the position of those in Turkey who
support a pluralist and secular model of development and increase the appeal of the Turkish model to
other states in the region. From the Turkish perspective, the agreement can lead to the consolidation
of Western values in Turkey. Deepening of economic integration with the EU can have a spillover
effect in the political arena by promoting individual freedoms and liberalization of Turkey's
constitutional and legal systems. Such liberalization, in turn, can benefit both the EU and Turkey in
the future assessment of thecountry's qualification for membership in the union.
In summary, both the EU and Turkey stand to gain economically and politically from the CU
agreement. However, as is the case in all EU-Turkey relations, opposition by Greece has spoiled
official expectations. To date, Greece has refused to lift its veto on the financial protocol that would
provide monetary assistance to Turkey in the amount of $500 million to ease the pressures of the
harmonization of customs schedules. [End Page 154]

Are There Alternatives for Turkey Besides the EU?
Turkish leaders realize that unless they pursue options for improving Turkey's economic and political
relations with other regions of the world, they risk placing their country in a vulnerable situation in the
twenty-first century. While EU membership represents an important priority for completing Turkey's
integration with the West, there are other options available for strengthening the country's global
position. The first is thedeepening of economic and political ties to the Turkic states of the former
Soviet Union, while a second option is economic integration in the Black Sea region. In addition,
increased security and economic cooperation with Israel and improved trade relations with Japan,
Russia, and the United States will enhance Turkey's position in the world economy and strengthen its
regional security.
The Turkic States
Relations with the Turkic world represent the greatest potential for Turkey in the next century. Since
these countries gained their independence from the Soviet Union, Turkey has been a major player in
assisting them withinstitution-building, economic development, and foreign security cooperation. While
the degree of Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan varies, all parties have a common interest in bringing out a greater degree of cooperation
with one another. Turkey hasassisted these countries in gainingmembership in international
organizations and has provided them with diplomatic representation at Turkish foreign missions until
they establish their own offices.
During the last few years, Turkey and the Turkic republics signed agreements to assist the latter
witheconomic training and education of their youth. Agreements called for: establishing Turkish
cultural centers in the Turkic states; receiving 5,000 secondary school and 5,000 university students
from the Turkic states for education in Turkish schools, starting in the 1992-93 academic year;
providing Turkish university entrance examinations to students in the Turkic republics; publishing a
dictionary of Turkic languages; and promoting secular control over religious education. It is too early
to assess the success of these initiatives. However, it is worth noting that they are underway and that
the parties plan to expand them. Through the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA),
attached to the Foreign Ministry, Turkey has been coordinating direct assistance to the Turkic states
in sectors such as agriculture, education, small and medium enterprises, energy, tourism, civil
aviation, and insurance. According [End Page 155] to information provided by TIKA, the total value
of program and investment credits extended to the Turkic states to dateis $700 million. These credits
alsoconstitute important encouragement for Turkish businesses to enter Central Asian markets. The
total amount of letter of credits opened by the Turkish Ex-Im Bank stands at $509 million. In addition
to these credits, agreements were reached for the sale of foodstuffs on credit, worth around $355
million, with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Thus, the officialTurkish economic assistance and cooperation
program reaches almost $1.1 billion.

In addition to public sources of assistance, theTurkish private sector plays an important role in this
new partnership. Around four hundred Turkish companies currently do business in these republics
through a wide range of investment projects worth a total of $4.44 billion. Some of these efforts are
joint ventures with European or North American companies that highlight Turkey's strategic
significance as acrossroads between Central Asian and Western markets. For example, a consortium
established between Turkish and German companies signed a contract with the Kazakh government
for the construction of a $600 million power plant in the Aktubinsk region.
Energy exports from Central Asia and Azerbaijan represent the greatest potential for increasing
Turkey's influence in the region. Once again, the great powers of the region and the oil companies of
the West are engaged in a "Great Game" of geopolitics and realpolitik to exploit the energy resources
of these countries. At the heart of this game is the pipeline(s) needed to export oil and natural gas.
The Turkish government argues that Turkey is the most economic and safe route for oil and gas
transport to the European markets. This argument is debatable consideringthe shorterRussian option
of exporting oil from the port of Novorossiisk. However, the Russian route assumes that the Turkish
straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) are capable of handling the heavy supertanker traffic.
Although the final decision on the pipeline issue hasnot yet beenmade, the United States has
announced its preference forthe Turkish option of theBaku-Ceyhan pipeline through Georgia.
TheTurkish plan gained additional endorsement from the exporters in March 1998, when theforeign
ministers of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan signed an energy cooperation
agreement on building a large pipeline for oil exports from the Caspian Sea across Georgia and Turkey
to Western markets. 21 In addition, they also backed a project to transport oil and gas from
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan via an underwater pipeline from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea
to Baku.If this last point becomes a real option, it will significantly enhanceTurkey's [End Page 156]
position among the oil pipeline options, over the Russian alternative.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone
Another potentially important initiative undertaken by Turkey is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Zone (BSECZ). This is an eleven-nation regional organization founded in 1992 following the initiatives
of the late Turkish President Turgut Özal. The founding agreements envision a gradual process that
will eventually create a free trade zone around the Black Sea. However, given the fact that several of
these countries currently have strainedpolitical relationswith each other, the future success of the
BSECZ is highly debatable. Nevertheless, the heads of government of the member countries have held
annual conferences tochart the future course of economic cooperation in the region. In late June
1998, the BSECZ held its fifth annual conference to discuss regional security issues in addition to the
possibility of setting up a regional free trade zone and stock exchange. This meeting followed an
earlier initiative in May 1998 between Russia and Turkey, when the two sides signed an agreement
for cooperation in the fields of navigation, oceanography, and environmental protection of the Black
Sea. 22 Thus far, very little gain has been achieved with regard to the establishment ofa regional free
trade agreement. For its part, however, Turkey signed an agreement with Bulgaria and Romania to
establish a free trade zone between the three countries. If all goes according to plan, this agreement
is to take effect byearly 1999.

Conclusions
The above analysis demonstratesthat EU-Turkey relations, while being at an all time low, present
important challenges to Turkish officials as they prepare their country for the next millennium. Despite
initial Turkish anger with the EU, it is highly unlikely that Turkey will abandon its traditional proWestern foreign policy in the future. There are significant economic, military, and political ties to the
West that assure the continuation of Turkey's pro-Western orientation. Moreover, if the Turks take
advantage of their strategic position, Turkey will be poised to be a key player in the crossroads of
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.With a growing dynamic economy, a secular and democratic
political system, and a modern military infrastructure, Turkey remains a crucial member of the

Western alliance in the region.
Without full membership in the EU, Turkey can still benefit from the CU agreement and facilitate
commerce, investment, and banking between Europe and the new markets. At the same time, Turkey
is an [End Page 157] ideal country for non-EU firms to invest in for the manufacture of products to
be sold in EU markets. Innovative investment policies, which are only possible by completing
structural adjustments in the Turkish economy, can achieve this goal. Furthermore, to protect the
Turkish economy against external shocks from the EU (associated with EMU), rational fiscal and
monetary policies must be implemented. The challenges include how to safeguard Turkey against
regional threats while improving economic ties with its neighbors, expanding trade links around the
globe, completing the process of financial integration with global capitalism, serving as a model for
other Turkic states, and improving relations with the EU (including Greece). These tasks are not easy
and require innovative and independent policymaking free of Cold War-era thinking. Parallel to
improving relations with the EU, some modest modification of economic priorities may be needed to
broaden Turkey's trade ties with the rest of the world. Already, efforts have begun to increase trade
relations with the United States and countries of the Far East.
In security affairs, Turkey's relations with the United States and NATO continue to improve and serve
as a reassurance of continued pro-Western foreign policy orientation. The recent increase in IsraeliTurkish military cooperation further guarantees this orientation, although the regional Islamic states
and Greece view the Israeli-Turkish military cooperation as a threat. At a recent Arab LeagueSummit
of the Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, the participants called upon Turkey to reconsider its military
relations with Israel and added that this cooperation presents a clear threat to the Arab world. 23
Finally, a brief mention of the Cyprus problem is in order because this issue will continue to threaten
EU-Turkey relations. While the current deadlock in the Cyprus negotiations and the drastic reaction of
both Greece and Turkey to the status quo leave very little hope for a meaningful resolution of the
problem, the rational alternative for Turkey is to push ahead for a compromise on Cyprus before the
latter joins the EU. It is difficult to envision this when the Greek side demands such major concessions
from the Turks for a settlement. After all, the Greek Cypriots do not have an incentive to make large
concessions because they will soon join the EU. The United States must exert pressure on both sides
to come to a middle ground. The earlier UN confidence-building measures might be the logical place
to start. 24 At the same time, the United States and the EU ought to consider how Greece and Turkey
might be brought together through technical agreements (economic functionalism) similar to the
beginning of French-German economic integration. The functionalist approach, [End Page 158]
though it may raise some eyebrows in Ankara and Athens, is not impossible to implement. Many in
the Greek and Turkish business circles would welcome such opportunities. Cooperation in the energy
sector, industry, and shipping could serve as the starting points.
In conclusion, contrary to predictions by Turkey's foes that this country's strategic significance would
diminish after the end of the Cold War, Turkey has become that much more important for
theeconomic and security interests of the Western powers. Creative policies that capitalize on Turkey's
geopolitical and economic assets can position Turkey to play a significant and ascendantrole in the
region. This calls for maintaining strong economic and political relations with the EU, regardless of
membership and Greek-Turkish problems, coupled with Turkish initiatives aimed at strengthening the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and ties with the Turkic states.
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